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Antecedents of support for social media content moderation and 
platform regulation: the role of presumed effects on self and others 
Martin J. Riedl, Kelsey N. Whipple, and Ryan Wallace 
Abstract 
This study examines support for regulation of and by platforms and provides insights into public 
perceptions of platform governance. While much of the public discourse surrounding platforms 
evolves at a policy level between think tanks, journalists, academics and political actors, little 
attention is paid to how people think about regulation of and by platforms. Through a 
representative survey study of U.S. internet users (N = 1,022), we explore antecedents of support 
for social media content moderation by platforms, as well as for regulation of social media 
platforms by the government. We connect these findings to presumed effects on self (PME1) and 
others (PME3), concepts that lie at the core of third-person effect (TPE) and influence of presumed 
influence (IPI) scholarship. We identify third-person perceptions for social media content: 
Perceived negative effects are stronger for others than for oneself. A first-person perception 
operates on the platform level: The beneficial effects of social media platforms are perceived to 
be stronger for the self than for society. At the behavioral level, we identify age, education, 
opposition to censorship, and perceived negative effects of social media content on others (PME3) 
as significant predictors of support for content moderation. Concerning support for regulation of 
platforms by the government, we find significant effects of opposition to censorship, perceived 
intentional censorship, frequency of social media use, and trust in platforms. We argue that 
stakeholders involved in platform governance must take more seriously the attitudes of their 
constituents. 
Keywords: content moderation, social media, platform regulation, third-person effect, survey, free 
speech 
Introduction 
Content moderation and platform regulation are having a moment. While just a few years ago the 
profession of content moderators was largely unknown to the public, profiles in prominent news 
outlets (e.g., A. Chen, 2017) have raised awareness for this critical digital labor issue. At the 
same time, congressional hearings on Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, a U.S. 
law regulating the liability of internet platforms (Medeiros, 2017), as well as hearings in which 
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg provided testimony on Capitol Hill, have thrust social media 
platforms to the front and center of ongoing political debate. 
The spotlight on platform regulation, perceived biases of social media platforms (Allen & 
VandeHei, 2019), and the ways in which platforms are enmeshed in major social events 
including elections (e.g., Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017) have exposed the complicated relationships 
between platforms and society. Today, people question how platforms govern online content 
production and distribution. The Pew Research Center reports that about 70% of Americans 
think social media platforms likely censor political viewpoints (Smith, 2018). Content 
takedowns, however, are foremost a risk-mitigation project: Certain types of content, such as 
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terrorist propaganda, child pornography, or hate speech are more harmful to society than others. 
Lawmakers and activists alike are calling for platforms to remove such harmful content with 
increased speed and transparency. 
 
Ongoing discussions about platform governance (Gorwa, 2019) are valuable; however, they 
often ignore critical questions about what users and nonusers think. This study explores 
antecedents of support for regulation by and of platforms in light of perceived effects of social 
media in society from an audience perspective. 
 
Through a representative, cross-sectional survey study of the United States internet population 
(N = 1,022), we explore these issues in two critical ways: First, we investigate and survey factors 
impacting support for content moderation by platforms and presumed effects of social media 
content on the self vis-à-vis other people. Second, we explore factors impacting support for 
increased government regulation for platforms, and presumed effects related to the impact of 
platforms on society vis-à-vis the self. In doing so, we explore the perceptual claims of the third-
person effect (TPE). Our inquiry is informed by scholarship on TPE and the influence of 
presumed influence (IPI) framework, as well as more recent scholarship emphasizing the 
importance of considering the impact of perceived effects on self (PME1) vis-à-vis perceived 




Content moderation as regulation by platforms 
 
Content moderation relates to “governance mechanisms that structure participation in a 
community to facilitate cooperation and prevent abuse [italics in original]” (Grimmelmann, 
2015, p. 47). Moderation is contingent on user-generated content, or UGC, and often outsourced 
and opaque by design (Roberts, 2019). UGC can be moderated ex-ante, or ex-post (Klonick, 
2017), the latter of which can be done by moderation teams wading through forums, or by 
responding to audience members flagging content (Naab et al., 2018). Moderation is further 
enabled by computational means, for example through machine learning and filtering (Myers 
West, 2018). Moderation can also be a volunteer activity; Matias (2019) describes content 
moderation that is carried out by volunteers as a type of civic labor. Content moderation is one of 
the most pervasive functions of social media platforms, as it is instrumental to shaping the 
content regimes that users encounter. Gillespie (2018) describes moderation as the main 
commodity platforms offer. Content moderation also confronts societies with important 
questions about civic liberties, such to what extent citizens want private actors like social media 
platforms to police content, and how freedom of expression factors into content governance 
regimes. In the United States, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act governs the 
liability of platforms (Medeiros, 2017) and makes it possible for platforms to voluntarily conduct 
moderation. When content moderation is framed as regulation, law scholars such as Klonick 
(2017) refer to platforms with terms such as the new governors. The underlying assumption of 
moderation is that some content is considered to be detrimental to users. To explore attitudes and 
perceptions surrounding social media content and moderation, we turn our attention to 
perceptions of such effects on self (PME1) as well as perceived effects on others (PME3), and 
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two frameworks associated with these perceptions: The third-person effect (TPE) and the 
influence of presumed influence (IPI) model. 
 
Third-person effect, presumed influence on self and others, and social media 
 
The third-person effect (TPE) of communication arises when an individual exposed to a mass 
media message perceives that message as being more impactful or persuasive to others than to 
him or herself (Davison, 1983). The third-person effect also predicts that people make decisions 
based on their assumptions of media impact (Gunther, 1991). For example, they might support 
restricting or censoring media messages (Salwen & Dupagne, 1999) to protect others who might 
be influenced. Researchers have examined the third-person effect in the context of key domains 
of online content and content moderation, including internet pornography (Lee & Tamborini, 
2005; Lo & Wei, 2002), Facebook (Paradise & Sullivan, 2012; Tsay-Vogel, 2016), and online 
comments (Chen & Ng, 2016). More recently, researchers have extended the concept to the 
domain of social media platforms. For example, Betts et al. (2019) found that people perceive 
others as more likely to experience cyber bullying than themselves. In the domain of fake news, 
that is, news propagating false information, stronger third-person perceptions have been shown 
to lead to lower support for regulation (Jang & Kim, 2018). Tsay-Vogel (2016) tested a 
perceived Facebook effect from a third-person perspective and confirmed that people perceive 
Facebook as affecting others more than themselves. However, her measurement conflates 
content effects and platform effects, issues we are keen to distinguish in this present study.  
 
The literature on TPE propagates two core hypotheses: The first one assumes that there is a 
perceptual difference between how a person thinks they might be affected by media content 
versus how others might be. This perceptual difference is widely established and so is its reverse, 
called a first-person effect, which appears, “[w]hen a presumed media effect is socially 
desirable” (Baek et al., 2019, p. 303). While a large majority of research focused on perceptions 
of undesirable content, first-person perceptions are important to consider when contemplating 
socially desirable content, or, as this study proposes, infrastructures such as social media 
platforms. The second hypothesis of TPE posits that the difference between perceived effects on 
others (PME3) and on self (PME1) impacts support for regulation – a behavioral claim that has 
been contested (Chung & Moon, 2016). In line with the established perceptual hypothesis, we 
posit: 
 
H1. Participants will perceive the negative effects of social media content to be stronger 
for others than for themselves. 
 
The third-person effect has long been examined alongside censorship (Davison, 1983). Using it, 
censors and those who support censorship of some type of media content or another can claim 
that they are acting to protect the interests of third parties who are more susceptible to media 
messages than they are (Davison, 1983; Salwen & Dupagne, 1999). Concerning the behavioral 
hypothesis, researchers have found inconclusive connections between third-person effects and 
support for regulation of Facebook (Paradise & Sullivan, 2012), whereas other research related 
to sexual content has found strong connections between third-person effects and support for 
censorship (Chia et al., 2006). 
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More recently, researchers including Jang and Kim (2018) have not found a link between third-
person effects and support for government regulation. Cheng and Chen (2020) suggest that this 
lack of relationship may be based on social media users’ own wariness of government regulation. 
In this case, examining the influence of presumed influence (IPI; Gunther & Storey, 2003) on 
others may be more useful in understanding attitudes toward regulation. Indeed, looking more 
closely at users’ presumptions of the negative effect of media on others — rather than on the 
difference between self and others — shows a clearer link to support of regulation (Cheng & 
Chen, 2020; Gunther, 1991). Baek et al. (2019) found that people were more likely to support 
regulation as an outcome when they believed that fake news had an influence on both other 
people and themselves. Chung and Moon (2016) found that the perception that others are 
influenced (PME3) is a stronger predictor for support of censorship than the perception that 
oneself is influenced (PME1). 
 
Another strand of research, coined the diamond method (Schmierbach et al., 2011, Neuwirth & 
Frederick, 2002) proposes exploring a second-person effect (SPE), which relates to a summative 
term of perceived effects on self and others (PME1 + PME3) (Neuwirth & Frederick, 2002; Sun 
et al., 2008). This is of interest because such a formula “controls for the effects of general 
perceptions of strong media effects” (Schmierbach et al., 2011, p. 311), and because second-
person perceptions have been found to be strong predictors of behavior (Neuwirth & Frederick, 
2002).  
 
When considering explanations for these effects, proposed underlying psychological mechanisms 
generally fall into one of two categories: those that are cognition-based and those that are 
motivation-based (Nan, 2007). Cognitive explanations such as Gunther and Mundy’s (1993) 
biased optimism build on the human tendency to perceive the world through a dichotomous and 
often self-serving lens—one that separates the self and others within the mind. Alternatively, 
popular motivational explanations (Meirick, 2005) suggest that individuals self-enhance to 
perceive themselves as less vulnerable to media effects. 
 
We root our study in a conceptualization that assumes social media use entails serendipitous and 
unavoidable exposure to what Jack (2019) refers to as wicked content, which is “recognizably 
problematic, even if said content’s veracity, its provenance, and the intent with which it was 
distributed, are uncertain” (p. 436). Just how problematic content may be lies in the eye of the 
beholder, though possibilities to imagine what could constitute bad, wicked, or otherwise 
harmful content are endless and leave ample room to platforms for intervention and moderation. 
Research documents the powerful role that hate speech (e.g., Pohjonen, 2019), online incivility 
(e.g., G. M. Chen, 2017) and disinformation or propaganda (e.g., Woolley & Howard, 2018) can 
play in online spaces, rendering considerations of harm on both personal and societal levels. 
Exposure to incivility, for instance, can lead to emotional exhaustion (Riedl et al., 2020), and 
emotional distress (Lee-Won et al., 2019). Incivility can also lead to anger when someone’s in-
group is targeted (Gervais, 2015). 
 
Research indicates that 45% of Americans think that technology companies have a 
“responsibility to protect the public from objectionable content” (Ballard, 2019, n. p.). At the 
same time, 41% of Americans think that “[r]removing user-created content from social media 
sites is suppressing free speech” (Ballard, 2019, n. p.).  
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Given how social media platforms are implicated in interference in democratic elections in the 
U.S. and abroad and the strategic spread of misinformation internationally, the responsibility of 
tech companies stretches well beyond protecting the public from objectionable content (e.g., 
Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017). Social media platforms, through their user agreements and content 
moderation, largely govern what users can do and say on their platforms. However, while 
significant interest has recently concentrated on structural questions of governance, how 
platforms shape discourse, and what content should be freely shared, less attention is paid to user 
perceptions. Because the salience of particular content on social media may not only shape what 
audiences think but can also actively shape the public agenda, moderation of these spaces is both 
important and highly contested. Given this reality, we aim to explore which factors, alongside 
PME1 and PME3, impact support for social media content moderation. Because support for 
content moderation, as well as free speech concerns tethered to content moderation by platforms, 
are related to political ideology (Ballard, 2019), we include as variables political attitudes and 
support for free speech. Other domains of interest include general attitudes and behaviors toward 
platforms that may impact support for content moderation, such as frequency of social media 
use, pre-existing trust in platforms, ethical evaluations of platforms, and beliefs about whether 
platforms intentionally censor viewpoints. Anticipating that demographics will also factor into 
support for social media content moderation, we ask the following: 
 
 RQ1. What are the strongest predictors of support for social media content moderation? 
 
Platforms and support for governmental regulation 
 
In the United States, 46% of the internet population gets news from social media (Newman et al., 
2019). According to the Pew Research Center (2019), 70% of Americans use social media, a 
drastic increase from 5% in 2005. The term platform describes a technology corporation offering 
services and communication infrastructure to users (Gillespie, 2010; Helmond, 2015). Platforms 
depend upon attention and engagement, both of which are crucial for advertising. When 
platforms create offerings that impact how the internet evolves, they become the infrastructure 
on which others rely. As such, platform users are inevitably “susceptible to processes of 
capitalisation and proprietary enclosure” (Mackenzie, 2019, p. 2003). As Helmond (2015) 
argues, the key determinants of platforms are programmability and structuring through 
application programming interfaces (APIs). 
 
Scholars regularly contemplate the affordances that social platforms provide their users. In this 
vein, imagined affordance is a “term that helps scholars to reflect technological environments’ 
material qualities that mediate affective experiences” (Nagy & Neff, 2015, p. 2). In this vein, we 
are interested in how users perceive the benign effects of social media platforms. While literature 
typically suggests stronger effects on others than on the self, we anticipate the opposite – a first-
person perception – would be the case for beneficial effects of platforms. We argue this might be 
for three reasons: First, in line with the bias the Dunning-Kruger effect posits – namely that 
people overestimate their own cognitive skills (Dunning, 2011) – we suggest that one’s 
individual relationship to technology and the direct benefits expected from technology might be 
easier to grasp and heuristically process than the role of technology and its beneficial effects on 
society writ large. Second, because technology conveys the myth of a steady increase in 
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convenience for users (Postman, 1993), we assume that presumed influence on self will be 
stronger – people perceiving social media platforms as having a bigger beneficial effect – than 
presumed influence on others. Third, we posit that the proposition of social desirability of media 
content leading to first-person effects (Golan & Day, 2008) extends beyond the context of 
content and is also applicable to platforms themselves. A Pew Research Center survey points 
into this direction: While 36% of Americans say that tech companies impact on society has been 
more bad than good, 63% think the opposite (Smith, 2018). And while 24% think the impact on 
the self has been more bad than good, 74% believe the opposite (Smith, 2018). Therefore, we 
posit the following hypothesis: 
 
H2. Participants will perceive stronger beneficial effects of social media platforms on 
themselves than on society.  
 
Research underscores how social media platforms facilitate hierarchical relationships that shape 
much of the Internet as well as the rest of society (Fuchs, 2017). Case in point: In 2019 Facebook 
announced political actors would be allowed to advertise falsehoods and therefore held to 
different standards with regard to truth and speech norms than other users (Kreiss & McGregor, 
2019). Asymmetries in how content is moderated as well as beliefs about social media platforms 
may not only exacerbate perceptions on how the self and others are affected, but also shape 
attitudes in favor of government regulation and/or content moderation. 
 
Pew data from 2018 shows that 51% of Americans thought that “major technology companies 
(…) should be regulated more than they are now” (Smith, 2018, p. 7). We want to illuminate 
how different factors may impact regulation of social media platforms, including presumed 
influence on self (PME1) and on others (PME3), political attitudes, attitudes toward platforms, 
and demographic variables. To that end, we ask: 
 





The data used in this study were collected through a cross-sectional U.S. national panel survey 
conducted by the Digital Media Research Program at the University of Texas at Austin. The 
survey was administered online using the survey software package Qualtrics. This study received 
Institutional Review Board approval on January 30, 2019, and the survey data were collected in 
March and April of the same year. Respondents were recruited by Dynata, an international 
survey company that provides access to panels that represent the adult online population of the 
United States. 
 
Online panel data carry limitations, some of which we sought to overcome by implementing 
quotas based on gender, age, and race/ethnicity to match the distribution of these characteristics 
in the adult internet population in the United States as reported in December 2018 by the Pew 
Research Center. Previous research has validated this technique (e.g., Bode et al., 2014; Kim & 
Chen, 2015). The quota sampling process continued until subgroups (in our case, gender, age, 
race/ethnicity, as well as Hispanic yes/no) were fully populated and reached their respective 
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quotas. In total, 1,465 people responded to the survey (after sorting out unfinished cases), and 
443 further cases were screened out or excluded for failing quality checks implemented in the 
data collection process, such as speeding, straight-lining, or failed attention checksi. We 
implemented rigorous rules for screen-outs that are in line with the Pew Research Center’s most 
recent recommendations for identifying bogus survey takers (Kennedy et al., 2020). The final 
respondents to the survey (N = 1,022) were slightly more female, less Hispanic, more educated 
and wealthier than the U.S. internet population (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Demographic Profile of the U.S. Survey and U.S. Census 
 Authors’ Study, 
U.S. Survey, March 
2019 
Pew Research Center, 
U.S. Survey, December 
2018 
 (%) (%) 
Age:   
18-29 23.3 25.0 
30-49 38.4 36.0 
50-64 26.5 26.0 
65+ 11.8 12.0 
Gender:   
Male 46.8 49.0 
Female 53.2 51.0 
Race/Ethnicity:   
White 75.0 73.0 
Black 11.4 12.0 
Other 13.6 14.0 
Hispanic:   
Yes 5.8 15.0 
Education:   
High school or less 24.3 34.0 
Some college 35.1 34.0 
College+ 40.6 32.0 
Household Income:   
Less than $30K 27.1 31.0 
$30K-50K 17.7 18.0 
$50K-75K 20.6 14.0 
Greater than $75K 34.6 37.0 
 
 
Variables of interest 
 
Dependent variables related to regulation 
 
Support for social media content moderation was operationalized by using and adapting 
measures from Hoffner et al. (1999), originally conceived for censorship of television violence, 
to social media platforms. Via Likert-type items on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 
(strongly agree), we asked participants to rate three statements: “I support social media platforms 
prohibiting the publishing of certain kinds of content,” “Platforms should have review systems 
for all social media content before it is allowed to be published,” and “Platforms should have 
review systems for all social media content after it is published” (n = 1,021, M = 6.23, SD = 
2.26). These were used to form an index (α = .823). 
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Support for government regulation was operationalized using a single-item Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), prompting respondents to evaluate the 
statement “Government should regulate social media platforms more than they are regulated 
now” (Smith, 2018), n = 1,022, M = 4.92, SD = 2.77. 
 
Perceived effects on self and others 
 
Perceived effects of social media content on oneself builds on measures by Chen and Ng (2017). 
This variable was operationalized using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 10 (very 
much), prompting respondents to evaluate three statements: “How much do you think you are 
influenced by content on social media platforms?,” “How much do you think social media 
content leads you to be angry?,” and “How much do you think social media content leads you to 
be upset?” These were averaged into an index, n = 1,017, M = 4.81, SD = 2.37, α = .855. 
 
Perceived effects of social media content on others followed the same wording as the previous 
variable, but instead of ‘you,’ the three items asked how ‘other adults’ were impacted by social 
media content. This is in analogy to the dichotomy of ‘you’ vs. ‘other people’ used in TPE 
research (e.g., Hoffner et al., 1999). The resulting index had good reliability, n = 1,018, M = 
7.14, SD = 1.86, α = .882. 
 
Perceived impact of social media platforms on self. On a Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), respondents were prompted to evaluate the statement “The 
impact that social media platforms and their products and services have had on me personally 
has been more good than bad” (Smith, 2018), n = 1,022, M = 5.23, SD = 2.452. 
 
Perceived impact of social media platforms on society. On a Likert-type scale from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), respondents were prompted to evaluate the statement “The 
impact that social media platforms have had on society has been more good than bad” (Smith, 




Partisanship was operationalized through a Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (Strong 
Republican) over 5 (Independent) to 10 (Strong Democrat), after the prompt: “Generally 
speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?”, n = 
1,022, M = 6.34, SD = 3.04. 
 
Opposition to censorship was operationalized using a subscale with good reliability (Alvarez & 
Kemmelmeier, 2018). We used a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 
(strongly agree), for eight statements including “It is better to limit some violent or offensive 
speech than to allow all of it” (reverse-coded), “All points of view, no matter how offensive, 
should be allowed to be expressed in public (e.g., at rallies, public demonstrations, protests, 
etc.),” or “If it causes severe distress on others, public speech should be heavily restricted” 
(reverse-coded). Based on this, we formed an index, n = 1,021, M = 5.34, SD = 2.05, α = .888. 
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Support for free speech was operationalized based on censorship measures used by Rojas, Shah 
and Faber (1996). We used a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly 
agree) for three statements: “No matter how controversial an idea is, an individual should be able 
to express it publicly,” “Everybody should have full liberty of promoting what they believe to be 
true,” and “All individuals should have the right to openly express their ideas, no matter how 
prejudiced they might be,” for which we recoded one item before forming an index with 




Perceived intentional censorship was operationalized using a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), prompting respondents to evaluate the statements 
“Social media platforms intentionally censor viewpoints,’ “The people working at social media 
platforms intentionally censor viewpoints,” and “Algorithms at social media platforms 
intentionally censor viewpoints” (Smith, 2018). These were averaged into an index, n = 1,020, M 
= 6.10, SD = 2.20, α = .876. 
 
Frequency of social media use was operationalized using a single-item Likert-type scale ranging 
from 1 (rarely/never) to 10 (often), which asked participants “How often do you use social media 
sites?” (Correa et al., 2010), n = 1,018, M = 6.80, SD = 3.26. 
 
Trust in social media platforms was operationalized using a single-item Likert-type scale ranging 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), prompting respondents to evaluate the 
statement “I can trust social media platforms to do what is right” (Smith, 2018), n = 1,022, M = 
4.09, SD = 2.48. 
 
Perceived ethical behavior of platforms was operationalized using a single-item Likert-type scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree), prompting respondents to evaluate the 




We sought to control for four relevant demographic variables: age (M = 44.47, SD = 16.20), 
gender, race, whether someone was Hispanic, and education (see Table 1 for demographics). All 




In line with research on the third-person effect, H1 predicted that participants would perceive the 
effects of social media content on others to be stronger than on themselves. We ran a paired t-test 
and found a significant difference between effects on oneself (M = 4.81, SD = 2.37) and others 
(M = 7.13, SD = 1.86); t(1016)=-28.380, p =.000. We used Hierarchical Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression to answer RQ1, which asked what the strongest predictors of support for social 
media content review were. When all variables were entered in the full model, they accounted 
for 40.7% of the variance in the dependent variable, support for social media content review 
(R2Adjusted = .407, F(15, 996) = 47.262, p < .001). Based on standardized beta coefficients (Table 
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2), we found that age (β = .098, p < .001), a higher level of education (β = .075, p < .05), 
opposition to censorship (β = -.553,  p < .001) and the perceived effects of social media content 
on others (β = .161, p < .001) had significant effects on support for social media content review.ii 
In the tradition of the diamond model, we follow Schmierbach et al.’s (2011) recommendation of 
conducting a first regression with PME1 and PME3 as separate independent variables, and a 
second regression with the self and other as a summative term for second-person perceptions. 
While our results and the discussion section primarily focus on the first regression, we also 
report results from the diamond model (R2Adjusted = .402, F(14, 997) = 49.603, p < .001) in Table 
2. 
 
Table 2  
Support for social media content moderation hierarchical OLS regression 
  Model 1: 
Perceived effects on self and 
others as predictors 
(Final model) 
Model 2: 
Second-person perception as 
predictor 
(Final model) 
 b β b β 
Demographics     
          Age  .014*** 
(.004) 
 .098  .016*** 
(.004) 
 .113 





          Race (White)  .257 
(.135) 
 .049  .285* 
(.136) 
 .055 
          Hispanic (Non-hispanic)  .282 
(.241) 
 .029  .303 
(.242) 
 .031 
          Education: Some college  
               (high school or less) 
 .130 
(.146) 
 .027  .134 
(.146) 
 .028 
          Education: College plus  
               (high school or less) 
 .348* 
(.144) 
 .075  .352* 
(.145) 
 .076 
          Adjusted R2 4.2% 4.2% 
Political attitudes    
          Partisanship  .029 
(.020) 
 .039  .028 
(.020) 
 .037 





          Free speech support  .043 
(.028) 
 .041  .058* 
(.028) 
 .055 
          R2 Change 33.8% 33.8% 
Platform attitudes and use    
          Perceived intentional 
               censorship 
-.005 
(.028) 
-.005  .002 
(.028) 
 .002 
          Frequency of social media 











          Perceived ethical 
               behavior of platforms 
 .060 
(.034) 
 .062  .046 
(.034) 
 .047 
          R2 Change 0.3% 0.3% 
Perceived effects on self/other/    
          self+other 
   
          Perceived effects of social 
               media content on self 
 .052 
(.027) 
 .055  -  -  
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          Perceived effects of social 
               media content on  
               others 
 .197*** 
(.034) 
 .161  -  - 
          Perceived effects of social 
               media content on  
               self+other 
 -  - .112*** 
(.018) 
 .166 
          R2 Change 2.7% 2.2% 
Total adjusted R2 40.7% 40.2% 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, n = 1,012. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
H2 predicted participants would perceive the beneficial effects of social media platforms to be 
stronger on themselves than on society. A paired t-test between effects on oneself (M = 5.23, SD 
= 2.45) and on society (M = 5.04, SD = 2.42) confirmed this hypothesis; t(2021)=-2.805, p = 
.005. 
 
OLS regression helped us answer RQ2, which examined the predictors of support for 
government regulation of social media platforms. When all variables were entered into the full 
model, they accounted for 16.1% of the variance in the dependent variable, support for social 
media content review (R2Adjusted = .161, F(15, 1000) = 14.022, p < .001). In analogy to the 
content-based regression, we also ran a regression for the summative term suggested by the 
diamond model (R2Adjusted = .160, F(14, 1001) = 14.829, p < .001), reported in Table 3. The 
standardized beta coefficients (Table 3) display effect sizes in relation to each other. In the first 
regression with PME1 and PME3, we found that, among political attitudes, opposition to 
censorship (β = -.231, p < .001) had a significant negative effect on support for government 
regulation of platforms. Among platform attitudes, perceived intentional censorship (β = .251, p 
< .001), frequency of social media use (β = -.187, p < .001), and trust in platforms (β =.188, p < 
.001) had significant effects. Neither demographics nor PME1 or PME3 had significant effects. 
 
Table 3 
Support for platform regulation hierarchical OLS regression 
  Model 1: 
Perceived effects on self and 
society as predictors 
(Final model) 
Model 2: 
Second-person perception as 
predictor 
(Final model) 
 b β b β 
Demographics     
          Age  .003 
(.005) 
 .017  .003 
(.005) 
 .015 





          Race (White)  .371 
(.196) 
 .058  .361 
(.196) 
 .057 





          Education: Some college  






          Education: College plus  






          Adjusted R2 1.1% 1.7% 
Political attitudes    
          Partisanship -.007 -.008 -.006 -.006 
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(.028) (.028) 





          Free speech support  .020 
(.041) 
 .016  .011 
(.040) 
 .008 
          R2 Change 6.3% 6.3% 
Platform attitudes and use    
          Perceived intentional 
               censorship 
 .317*** 
(.039) 
 .251  .322*** 
(.039) 
 .256 
          Frequency of social media 






          Trust in platforms  .209*** 
(.049) 
 .188  .202*** 
(.049) 
 .182 
          Perceived ethical 
               behavior of platforms 
 .005 
(.051) 
 .004  .005 
(.051) 
 .004 
          R2 Change 9.2% 9.2% 
Perceived effects on self/society/    
          self+society 
   
          Perceived effects of  
               platforms on self 
 .051 
(.045) 
 .045  -  -  
          Perceived effects of  





 -  - 
          Perceived effects of  
               platforms on  
               self+society 
 -  - -.008 
(.025) 
-.012 
          R2 Change 0.2% 0.0% 
Total adjusted R2 16.1% 16.0% 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses, n = 1,016. 




The purpose of this study was to measure public attitudes regarding two important forms of 
social media regulation in society: content moderation through social media platforms and 
government regulation of social media platforms. We explored presumed negative effects of 
social media content on self and others and presumed beneficial effects of platforms on society 
and on the self, as well as how both perceptions relate to support for content moderation and 
platform regulation, respectively. We identified third-person perceptions regarding the presumed 
negative effects of social media content, and first-person perceptions regarding the presumed 
positive effects of platforms on society. 
 
In our model, significant predictors of support for social media content moderation included age, 
education, opposition to censorship, and perceived effects of social media content on others 
(PME3). It stands to reason that opposition to censorship surfaces as a strong negative predictor 
of support for content moderation. Research has documented severe concerns about freedom of 
expression in light of content moderation (Ballard, 2019). When someone is fundamentally 
opposed to censorship, their opposition appears to extend into the realm of moderation. Our 
study aligns with what scholarship on PME1 and PME3 predicts (Chung & Moon, 2016). In the 
domain of social media content and its moderation, we find that PME3 significantly impacts 
support for moderation, while PME1 does not. When additionally consulting the diamond 
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method, we found a significant effect of the summative term of PME1 + PME3 on support for 
moderation. 
 
Moving on to support for government regulation of platforms, we found a first-person 
perception: The perceived beneficial effects of social media platforms were significantly stronger 
on oneself than on society. Research suggests that first-person perceptions may occur in the 
context of desirable content (Golan & Day, 2008). Our research extends the applicability of a 
first-person perspective to communicative infrastructures – social media platforms. We can only 
speculate why that might be the case. The imagined affordances of platforms (Nagy & Neff, 
2015) may be easier to conceptualize on a personal level that is rooted in one’s own experience 
of platforms vis-à-vis the abstract notion of beneficial effects of platforms on society. While we 
did not measure underlying psychological mechanisms, the proposition that self-enhancement 
(Meirick, 2005) may be governing how the benefits of social media platforms were felt more 
strongly for the self than for society provides a compelling possible explanation. 
 
The full regression model analyzing support for government regulation of platforms did not find 
significant effects of PME1 or PME3 on support for government regulation of platforms. It is 
possible that the imaginable larger benefits of platforms are difficult to conceptualize after all, so 
much so that an articulation of support for regulation becomes tricky. Via the diamond model, 
we also did not find significant effects of the summative term of PME1 and PME3 on support for 
regulation. 
 
Like in the content moderation model, the main regression on platform regulation surfaced 
opposition to censorship as a strong negative predictor. However, perceived intentional 
censorship had a strong positive effect. This is noteworthy: When users think that platforms are 
intentionally censoring viewpoints, they are more supportive of government regulation. Shifts in 
public sentiment about how social media companies regulate content may be conducive to 
increased future support for government intervention in and regulation of technology companies. 
 
Our results highlight the importance of attitudinal research about the role of social media 
platforms in society, particularly about what users think are possible harms and benefits of social 
media content and platforms. Platform operators and lawmakers must take seriously the 
constituents of platforms when setting up regimes of governance so that proportionality of 
measures is maintained. Studies such as ours help gauge public opinion on how to understand the 
powers and impact of social media platforms – knowledge which, as we argue, is critical in 
shaping and defining policy. 
 
This study expands research on the third-person effect by confirming the predictive power of 
PME3 for the behavioral variable of support for content moderation, but not for support for 
platform regulation. This is mirrored by results from the diamond model. We identify third-
person perceptions with regard to the impact of social media content, and first-person 
perceptions with regard to the impact of platforms writ large, thus extending the applicability of 
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This study is not without limitations. The survey design prohibited us from exploring further the 
motivations for specific perceptions. Furthermore, as a cross-sectional study, we cannot make 
conclusive statements about causal relations. Measuring perceptions toward regulation of and by 
platforms was conducted with items about the negative impact of content on ‘you’ vs. ‘other 
people,’ and about the positive impact of platforms on ‘me personally’ vs. ‘society.’ While 
differences in measurement are tied to how the survey study was conducted, the lack of parallel 
measurements posits a limitation to our study. Within the domain of TPP and FPP, measures 
typically distinguish between other individuals and the self, rather than between other individuals 
and society. This conceptual nuance was not maintained in our measures. We acknowledge this 
as a limitation to our study and invite future researchers to test these relationships with updated 
sets of items. We included the summative term of effects on others and self in the spirit of 
Schmierbach et al. (2011) for future research with a particular emphasis on second-person 
perceptions (Neuwirth & Frederick, 2002) to engage with. Exemplary research on the diamond 
method includes Sun, Shen and Pan’s (2008) work which can be helpful in mapping paths 
forward for more research in this area. 
 
In lieu of more sophisticated models (e.g., on interrelationships between frequency of social 
media use, exposure to negative content, and first-person perceptions), we opted for 
parsimonious models aimed at our primary research questions and hypotheses. While the use of 
single-item measures is not preferred from a psychometric standpoint, regardless of their face 
validity, in this study it allowed for the inclusion of a variety of measures in a large-scale survey 
(Scherr, 2018). We suggest future research to test and develop multiple-item scales alongside our 
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i A relatively high rate of screen-outs can be explained by both our conservative quality criteria to protect the 
integrity of the collected dataset, as well as the length of the survey. Beyond what is reported, the survey also 
included dimensions on fake news, representation, (social) media and journalism. We carefully designed and 
pretested the questionnaire to avoid potential response bias. Few to no topically similar questions were asked prior 
to the ones used in this study, with the intent to avoid question order effects. 
ii While we limited our analytical inquiry to PME3, PME1, and the effect of their summative term as suggested by 
the diamond method, we also calculated TPPs and entered them into the regression model. Neither in the content 
moderation nor the platform regulation model did TPP have a significant effect on the behavioral variables of 
support for regulation. 
